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fig. 1- Vauban: builder of fortresses. · 
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THE MARQUIS DE VAUBAN AND MILITARY FORTIFICATIONS 
by • 
Lee H. Hanson, Jr. 
The Marquis de Sebastien Le Prestre Vauban died in 1707. During his life· 
time he was the chief military engineer for Louis XIV and was responsible for 
building or strengthening over 300 fortified positions. He wrote a manuscript on 
siegecraft which was not published until several years after his death, but became 
the manual for subsequent European offensive and defensive tactics. Indeed, his 
influence was still strong as late as the American Civil War. 
Vauban's actual contributions to siege tactics are debatable. What he did 
mainly was to pull together and codify various 17th century practices into a single 
plan of Bttack Bnd ,defense. He is credited with never having lost a fortress on 
defense or failing to take one on offense. This, naturally, gave his writings a con· 
siderable weight of authority. 
We .do not propose to go into the specifics of Vauban's tactics, but there are 
certain principles involved which will perhaps shed light on events during the 
American Revolution. Vauban believed that the best defense was a good offense; 
no fortress was impregnable, with the possible exception of those built in the 
middle of swamps where access was difficult for the attacking force. Because a fort 
must fall sooner or later using the tactics he advocated, it was the role of the 
defenders to delay the inevitable as long as possible so that a relief expe~ition could 
lift the siege. The defenders were to throw a succession of obstacles in the path of 
the attackers as the siege progressed from an encirclement of the fortress to the 
final assault. 
The first obstacle was the design of the fort itself. There were four basic 
shapes: bastion, star, round, and lunette. Often, features of one type would be 
grafted onto another in the large fortifications. The_se forts were basically shaped 
to lessen the effects of artillery fire by presenting oblique angles to incoming shells. 
At the same time, it was possible for the defenders to cover each part of the fort 
from one or more other parts. Surrounding the fort was a ramp of earth called the 
glacis which offered no cover for attacking infantry, and, more importantly, 
shielded all but the upper portion of the fort walls from artillery fire. Behind this 
was a deep ditch filled with water or lined with pickets to impede infantry. Instead 
of building a fort with 20 foot high walls, it was better to build one with 10 foot 
~lis and surround it with a ditch 10 feet deep. 
In the early stag~s of. a siege the attackers would cut off all avenues of 
approach to a fort and set up outposts to warn of relief expeditions. They then 
began a series of zig-zag trenches up to the walls of the fort connected with laterals 
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which were to permit movement between trenches and keep the defenders in the 
dark about where the final assault would take place until it was too late to prevent 
it. This system of several parallel trenches was apparently Vauban's own contribu-
tion to military strategy. It took longer and was more costly than concentrating all 
effort on a single trench but the chances for success were greatly increased. When 
these trenches got close to the fort the defenders were supposed to sally forth, 
preferably at night, and attack the work parties, driving them off and destroying 
their trenches by burning the revetting, or shoring, or setting explosives. This was 
only a delaying tactic and eventually the attackers would reach the ditch. Here 
they would be protected from artillery fire because the defenders would be unable 
to depress their cannon sufficiently. The attackers would then bring up their own 
artillery to destroy a section of the wall at point-blank range or cross the ditch 
under a protective cover against small arms and incendiaries to tunnel under the 
wall and plant a large powder charge to blow a breach in the wall. The defenders 
would be digging their own tunnels to intercept the attackers and prevent the ex-
ploding of the mine. 
Once the breach was made, ·the attackers would pour as many men through 
the hole as possible and try to overrun as much of the fort as they could before the 
defenders could regroup. In larger fortresses, the defenders would throw up 
secondary earthworks behind the breach and the attackers would have to repeat the 
breaching operation. Hopefully, by this time a relief expedition would have been 
successful in driving off the attacking army. With all the trenches, mines, and 
countermines dug during a seige "reducing" a fort was an apt term for a successful 
attack. 
This has been only the briefest exposition of 18th century military strategy, 
but may help explain why many of the ··pfficers on both sides of the Revolution 
• 
seemed so slow and methodical in their m'vements. They wer:e merely following 
Vauban's step-by-step precepts. At the sam~ time, one explanation for why leaders 
like Benedict Arnold were not advanced despite their success may be that in the 
eyes of their superiors they broke too many of the established rules. 
(Reference: S. L de Vauban, Manual of Siegecrah and Fortifications, translated by 
George A. Rothrock, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1958.) 
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